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I. HOW OSCAR WILDE GOT THE WRONG ADVICE FROM HIS SOLICITOR 
On Wednesday, April 6, 1881, in its judgment in Wheeler v. Le 
Marchant, 1 the English Court of Appeal confirmed that the "rule as to the 
non-production of communications between solicitor and client" had "been 
established upon grounds of general or public policy"2 "in order that . . . 
legal advice may be obtained safely and sufficiently."3 On Friday, March 1, 
* Mr. Turriff was called to the bar and admitted as a solicitor in British Columbia, 
Canada, in 1975. His field of practice is lawyer-client financial relationships and costs of 
litigation (attorney fee shifting). In 2009, he was the president of the Law Society of British 
Columbia. That society, which is not a lawyer advocacy group, regulates British Columbia 
lawyers in the public interest. Mr. Turriff is a founding member and director of the Interna-
tional Society for the Promotion of the Public Interest of Lawyer Independence. He acknowl-
edges the very fine assistance of his secretary, Marianne Stoody, who has contributed invalu-
ably to his work over the past five years. 
l. (1881) 17 Ch. D. 675 (C.A.). 
2. !d. at 683. 
3. !d. at 682. The court's rationale for the preservation of the confidentiality of 
lawyer-client communications is not universally accepted (and, despite my suggestion oth-
erwise, perhaps the Wilde story I recount here proves that the rationale is not supportable). 
See, e.g., Neil J. Williams, Four Questions of Privilege: The Litigation Aspect of Legal Pro-
fessional Privilege, in INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON CIVIL JUSTICE 219 n.5 (l.R. Scott 
ed., 1990); Adam M. Dodek, Reconceiving Solicitor-Client Privilege, 35 QUEEN'S L.J. 493 
(2009); Alice Woolley, Rhetoric and Realities: What Independence of the Bar Requires of 
Lawyer Regulation, 4 U. CALGARY SPP REs. PAPERS 1, 36 n.l49 (2011) [hereinafter Wool-
ley, Rhetoric]. Dodek suggests that the "full and frank disclosure" justification for the privi-
lege is unsustainable when the reason for a client's decision to reveal has nothing to do with 
whether the lawyer might or might not pass information along to a third party. See Dodek, 
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1895, Oscar Wilde visited a solicitor, C.O. Humphreys, in Humphreys's 
offices in Giltspur Chambers, Holborn Viaduct, London.4 Humphreys was 
"a most experienced criminallawyer."5 Wilde was forty.6 "Two of his plays 
were running in the West End of London . . . , both of them huge success-
es."7 A few years earlier, Wilde had taken up with Lord Alfred Douglas, a 
son of the eighth Marquis of Queensberry.8 Douglas, who was known as 
Bosie, was twenty-four in early 1895.9 Queensberry, who had developed the 
rules of boxing, was livid about his son's association with Wilde. 10 Wilde 
supra, at 509-10. Dodek also argues that the privilege rests on a weak footing because many 
clients don't know there is a privilege to claim. Jd. at 509. The response to that point may be 
to suggest to regulators of lawyers that they require lawyers to explain matters of confidenti-
ality and privilege to their clients as a first step in the creation of the client-lawyer relation-
ship of trust. 
4. FRANNY MOYLE, CONSTANCE: THE TRAGIC AND SCANDALOUS LIFE OF MRS. 
OSCAR WILDE 257 (2011); H. MONTGOMERY HYDE, OSCAR WILDE 253 (1975) [hereinafter 
HYDE, OSCAR WILDE]. 
5. HYDE, OSCAR WILDE supra note 4, at 247; H. MONTGOMERY HYDE, THE TRIALS 
OF OSCAR WILDE 9, 80 (1962) ("that very experienced criminal lawyer" and "his extensive 
criminal practice") [hereinafter HYDE, TRIALS]. Cf G.J. RENIER, PH. D., OSCAR WILDE 110 
(1933) (where C.V. [sic] Humphreys is said to have been "the senior partner of ... Hum-
phreys and May," described as "family solicitors" with "no experience of criminal matters"). 
Dr. Renier may have had the wrong Humphreys. Wilde saw Charles Octavius Humphreys, 
whose firm was known as C.O. Humphreys, Son & Kershaw. HYDE, OSCAR WILDE, supra 
note 4, at 247; MERLIN HOLLAND, THE REAL TRIAL OF OSCAR WILDE xx-xxi (2003); RUPERT 
HART-DAVIS, SELECTED LETTERS OF OSCAR WILDE 131 n.4 (1962). Humphreys's son, Trav-
ers, later Mr. Justice Humphreys, was a junior to Wilde's barrister, Sir Edward Clarke, Q.C., 
at the Wilde trials. See HYDE, TRIALS, supra, at 88, 88 n.3. Sir Travers Humphreys wrote a 
forward to Hyde's TRIALS book. !d. at 7. It is inconceivable that he would not have corrected 
Hyde had Hyde been wrong about C.O. Humphreys's experience in criminal matters. 
6. He was born on October 16, 1854. See HOLLAND, supra note 5, at 64. It appears 
he could not accept his age. On April 3, 1895, at the Queensberry trial to which I refer, 
Wilde's counsel asked him, "I think you are thirty-eight years of age?" /d. at 45. Wilde an-
swered, "I am thirty-nine years of age." !d. Astutely, the first question put to him in cross-
examination was, "You stated at the commencement of your examination that you were 
thirty-nine years of age. I think you are over forty. Isn't that so?'' /d. at 64. Wilde had to 
admit he was, although not before saying he had "no intention of posing [!] for a younger 
man at all." /d. at 64. 
7. HESKETH PEARSON, THE LIFE OF OSCAR WILDE 258 (1946). The plays were An 
Ideal Husband and The Importance of Being Earnest. See id. at 247, 256; DOUGLAS 
MURRAY, BOSIE: A BIOGRAPHY OF LORD ALFRED DOUGLAS 74 (2000). An Ideal Husband was 
also "running on Broadway." VYVYAN HOLLAND, SON OF OSCAR WILDE 59 (1954) [hereinaf-
ter V. HOLLAND]. 
8. Wilde met Douglas in January 1891. HOLLAND, supra note 5, at xvi; HART-
DAVIS, supra note 5, at 89. They became fiiends in May 1892. HART-DAVIS, supra note 5, at 
89. In the sources I have consulted, "Marquis" and "Marquess" appear to be used inter-
changeably. I have used "Marquis" here because Queensberry himself used that spelling, as 
evidenced by his calling card, irifra note 13. 
9. See MURRAY, supra note 7, at 1-2. 
10. See HOLLAND, supra note 5, at xvii-xix; HYDE, OSCAR WILDE, supra note 4, at 
191-95. 
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and Douglas-Bosie particularly so--were bothered by Queensberry's op-
position and resisted it. 11 As events later proved, they didn't take Queens-
berry seriously enough. 
Ten days before Wilde saw Humphreys, Queensberry had left a card 
for Wilde with a porter at the Albemarle Club, off Picadilly. 12 The porter, 
whose name was Wright, 13 had read the card. Later he claimed not to have 
understood its meaning. 14 On the card, although part of the message is very 
hard to decipher, Queensberry had written: "For Oscar Wilde posing as 
Somdomite."15 "Somdomite" was Queensberry's slip. Wright had placed the 
card in an envelope, probably without having shown it to anyone. 16 On Feb-
11. RICHARD ELLMANN, OSCAR WILDE 393-96 (1987). 
12. PEARSON, supra note 7, at 280; HOLLAND, supra note 5, at p. xix. 
13. HOLLAND, supra note 5, at 4. 
14. See PEARSON, supra note 7, at 282; FRANCES W!NWAR, OSCAR WILDE AND THE 
YELLOW 'NINETIES 262 (3d ed. 1942); HYDE, OSCAR WILDE, supra note 4, at 196. As Wright 
testified at the Queensberry prosecution: "I looked at the card but I could not understand 
what was written upon it." See HOLLAND, supra note 5, at 44. That does seem hard to credit 
when it was he, and no one else I have discovered, who thought Queensberry had described 
Wilde as a "ponce and somdomite." See id. at 4 and discussion infra note 15. 
15. The card is reproduced in HOLLAND, supra note 5, at xiv; HYDE, TRIALS, supra 
note 5, preceding page 99. It can also be found on the Internet (search "Posing Somdomite"). 
There is some debate about the words Queensberry actually wrote. See, e.g., HOLLAND, supra 
note 5, at 300 n.4l; ELLMANN, supra note 11, at 438. There are at least four possibilities: 
"ponce and somdomite," "posing somdomite," "posing as sodomite," and "posing as a 
somdomite" (sometimes "Somdomite" is capitalized). See id. On Saturday, March 2, 1895, 
when Queensberry appeared before a magistrate, having been arrested on a warrant Hum-
phreys obtained on Wilde's instructions, the porter, Wright, testified that in his presence 
Queensberry had written on a card the words "For Oscar Wilde ponce and somdomite," at 
which moment it is recorded that Queensberry inteijected saying his words were "posing as 
sodomite." See HOLLAND, supra note 5, at 4. Holland and EHmann both state that it would 
have been easier for Queensberry to defend himself were his words "posing as somdomite," 
rather than "posing somdomite," because he would not have to show that Wilde was actually 
a sodomite. !d. at 300 n.4l; ELLMANN, supra note 11, at 438. As Hyde put it, the sole ques-
tion for the jury was one of fact: "did Oscar Wilde pose as a sodomite?" HYDE, TRIALS, su-
pra note 5, at 96. I am grateful to my wife, Ellen Gerber, a very experienced prosecutor, for 
helping me with this point. What Wilde said Queensberry wrote is recorded in his counsel's 
opening at the trial of Regina (on the prosecution of Oscar Wilde) v. John Douglas (Mar-
quess of Queens berry) and, formally, in the two counts of the indictment against Queens ber-
ry. There, Queensberry's words are recorded as "For Oscar Wilde posing as somdomite." See 
HOLLAND, supra note 5, at app. A, at 285-86. 
16. See WINWAR, supra note 14, at 262; PEARSON, supra note 7, at 282; PHILIPPE 
JULLIAN, OscAR WILDE 314-15 (1968). Wright's evidence at the criminal libel trial was that 
he had placed Queensberry's card in an envelope on which he wrote Wilde's name. 
HOLLAND, supra note 5, at 4. He was then asked by Wilde's counsel: "And [you] kept it in 
your custody until the 28th of February, which was the first date after the 18th [the date on 
which Queensberry had given Wright the card] when Mr. Wilde came to the club?" Id. at 44. 
Wright answered "Yes." !d. It is curious that Wilde's lawyer would lead Wright to say, effec-
tively, that he had control of the envelope for ten days. While Queensberry's message had 
obviously been published to Wright, might it not have been advantageous for Wilde's coun-
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ruary 28th, Wright had given Wilde the envelope. 17 Wilde was upset by 
Queensberry's imputation. 18 He described Queensberry's words as "hide-
ous."19 Douglas encouraged Wilde to prosecute Queensberry for criminal 
libel.20 Wilde didn't know what to do.21 Late that night, he consulted his 
friend, Robert RossY Ross was twenty-five.23 Probably against Ross's ad-
vice, Wilde went the next morning with Ross and Douglas to Humphreys's 
chambers.24 After some discussion, Humphreys recommended the proposed 
prosecution.25 That course proved to be disastrous for Wilde.26 Responsibil-
ity for the disaster is not unifonnly placed on the same shoulders by Wilde 
biographers.27 Half a century later, Humphreys's son justified his father's 
set at least to have left it to be inferred that there had been wider publication, especially when 
Wright had testified before the magistrate on March 2, 1895, that he had put the card in an 
envelope, which he did not seal, and had left it on his desk? See id. at 4. As it was, and not 
surprisingly given Wright's evidence that he did not understand Queensberry's words, 
Queensberry's counsel at the trial had no questions for Wright in cross-examination. !d. at 
45. 
17. HOLLAND, supra note 5, at 4. 
18. JULLIAN,supranote 16,at315. 
19. HART-DAVIS, supra note 5, at 129. 
20. HOLLAND, supra note 5, at xxi. Douglas's encouragement has recently been 
described as "mind-bogglingly incautious." See MOYLE, supra note 4, at 257. Incautious, but 
not surprising-in April 1894, when Queensberry wrote Douglas about his son's "loathsome 
and disgusting relationship" with Wilde, Douglas replied with a telegram that read simply, 
"What a funny little man you are." See ELLMANN, supra note II, at 417, 450; Cf HYDE, 
OSCAR WILDE, supra note 4, at 192. 
21. HART-DAVIS, supra note 5, at 129. 
22. Wilde had written Ross, "If you could come here at 11:30 please do so tonight." 
/d. Canadian readers might be interested to know that Ross's father had once been the Attor-
ney General of Upper Canada. !d. at 74. 
23. HART-DAVIS, supra note 5, at 74. 
24. ELLMANN, supra note 11, at 439; HOLLAND, supra note 5, at xxii; HYDE, OSCAR 
WILDE, supra note 4, at 197. 
25. ELLMANN, supra note II, at 439; HOLLAND, supra note 5, at xxii; HYDE, OSCAR 
WILDE, supra note 4, at 197. 
26. See generally HYDE, TRIALS, supra note 5. 
27. Compare, e.g., FRANK HARRIS, OSCAR WILDE: HIS LIFE & CONFESSIONS 199-
200, 202 (1910) (blaming Douglas, as does Bernard Shaw), Bernard Shaw, Epilogue to id. at 
400, 404, HYDE, TRIALS, supra note 5, at 95 (observing that Douglas "was most anxious that 
the case against his father should proceed"), and MOYLE, supra note 4 at 257 ("Bosie urged 
him to sue without hesitation"), with MURRAY, supra note 7, at 75 (reporting that Douglas 
"certainly supported" Wilde), ELLMANN, supra note II, at 395 (appearing to blame C.O. 
Humphreys, at least to some extent, recording that Humphreys was a bad choice because 
"homosexuality was quite outside [his] field of knowledge"), and RENIER, supra note 5, at 
110 (sharing EHmann's assessment that [if he had the right Humphreys] Humphreys had "no 
understanding of the questions involved"). See also Sir Travers Humphreys, Foreword to 
HYDE, TRIALS, supra note 5, at 10 (excusing his father and declaring Wilde and Douglas to 
be the "two persons responsible"). 
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endorsement of the prosecution as "natural and proper" "with the 
knowledge of the parties which [his father] then possessed."28 
It is said that before Humphreys gave Wilde his advice he had "asked 
Wilde point-blank on his solemn oath whether there was any truth in the 
libel [and that] Wilde solemnly assured him that he was absolutely inno-
cent."29 Wilde's solemn assurance was a lie. His prosecution ofQueensberry 
quickly collapsed under the weight of expected evidence of rent boys, 
turned up by Queensberry/0 apparently with help from an actor, Charles 
Brookfield, who is thought to have been "jealous of Wilde's success."31 On 
the Queensberry evidence, Wilde was himself successfully prosecuted for 
conduct that is no longer criminal, although it took two trials to convict 
him. 32 He was sentenced to and served two years imprisonment with hard 
labor.33 After his release, he produced only one further work of art-The 
Ballad of Reading GaoP4-although a long letter to Douglas, now known as 
De Profundis, which he brought with him out of prison, is very interesting.35 
Wilde died an outcast in 1900, just forty-six. He was witty to the end. He 
had once declined an invitation "owing to a subsequent engagement."36 In 
his last weeks, spent very uncomfortably in bed at the Hotel d' Alsace in 
Paris,37 he quipped that either he or the wallpaper in his room had to go38 
and that he was dying beyond his means.39 
28. Humphreys, Foreword to HYDE, TRIALS, supra note 5, at 9. 
29. HYDE, OSCAR WILDE, supra note 4, at 197. It is reported that Sir Edward Clarke, 
Q.C., asked Wilde a similar question. See id., at 202-03; PEARSON, supra note 7, at 283-84. 
30. "[S]uch individuals as a groom, an unemployed clerk, and a newspaper boy." 
See HYDE, OSCAR WILDE, supra note 4, at 186; THOMAS WRIGHT, BUILT OF BOOKS: HOW 
READING DEFINED THE LIFE OF OSCAR WILDE 225 n. * (2008) ("former music-hall comedians, 
grooms and bookmakers' assistants-turned-whores"); HOLLAND, supra note 5, at 286-91 
(including Queensberry's plea of justification, alleging, as against Wilde, that he incited the 
commission of "sodomy and other acts of gross indecency and immorality" and himself 
committed acts of gross indecency and immorality). 
31. HYDE, TRIALS, supra note 5, at 88-89; PEARSON, supra note 7, at 246-47. 
32. HOLLAND, supra note 5, at xxxiii-xxxiv; HYDE, TRIALS, supra note 5, at 150-
273. 
33. HOLLAND, supra note 5, at xxxiv. 
34. WRIGHT, supra note 30, at 283,286-87. 
35. HART-DAVIS, supra note 5, at 152, n.l. HYDE, TRIALS, supra note 5, at 297-98, 
describes the letter as "a curious document, a mixture of apology, self-abasement and violent 
recrimination." 
36. This remark is regularly attributed to Wilde but I cannot recall having seen it 
reported as having been heard by anyone in particular. 
37. HYDE, OSCAR WILDE, supra note 4, at 355. The hotel was located, fittingly, on 
the Rue des Beaux-Arts. See JULLIAN, supra note 16, at 327-28; ELLMANN, supra note 11, at 
559. 
38. ELLMANN, supra note 11, at 581. 
39. RENIER, supra note 5, at 157; HYDE, OSCAR WILDE, supra note 4, at 369; 
ELLMANN, supra note 11, at 581 (putting the statement less felicitously, saying that Wilde 
remarked, "I can't even afford to die"). 
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Why did Wilde lie to Humphreys? Why didn't he-in the language of 
Wheeler v. Le Marchant-safely tell Humphreys what Humphreys needed 
to know to get Humphreys's sufficient advice? In De Profundis, Wilde de-
scribed having been in Humphreys's office "that fatal Friday" "weakly con-
senting to my own ruin."40 Is that an accurate assessment or a rather pathetic 
reconstruction of what had occurred? Do these words help us to understand 
why Wilde didn't give himself the chance to get the informed advice he 
needed? The irony is that he would have saved himself had he depended on 
the public policy articulated in the Wheeler judgment, a product of the same 
system of justice that condemned him. 
Wilde's association with Douglas was well-known41 in the stratum of 
English society for which Wilde had become the darling by the mid-1890s.42 
It is likely that his association with the members of the underclass was not 
generally known,43 although he had become "more reckless" by 1895.44 He 
tried to justify that recklessness on the second day of his abortive Queens-
berry prosecution. He was under cross-examination by Edward Carson, 
Q.C., with whom he had been acquainted at Trinity College Dublin in the 
early 1870s.45 When Carson asked Wilde what he had in common with a 
young man of a lower class, Wilde answered: 
Well, I will tell you, Mr. Carson, I delight in the society of people much younger 
than myself. I like those who may be called idle and careless. I recognise no social 
distinctions at all of any kind and to me youth-the mere fact of youth-is so 
wonderful that I would sooner talk to a young man half an hour than even be, well, 
cross-examined in court.46 
Humphreys's son later wrote that Wilde's explanation rang "terribly 
hollow" and that his advisors, who included the son, "realized that the case 
[against Queens berry] was lost. "47 
It may have been acceptable to Wilde for members of his set to know 
he was consorting with the son of a Marquis but not acceptable to him for 
them to know he was associating with persons of a different sort. Perhaps he 
didn't understand that he could count on Humphreys to have kept his secret. 
Perhaps he didn't understand that the law would have protected from publi-
40. 
41. 
42. 
257-58. 
HART-DAVIS, supra note 5, at 171. 
See, e.g., ELLMANN, supra note 11, at 489-90, MOYLE, supra note 4, at 250-52. 
PEARSON, supra note 7, at 244 ("Society fawned on him"); see id. at 247-48, 
43. !d. at 266 ("Robert Sherard, Frank Harris and their like knew nothing of the 
Oscar known to Robert Ross, Reginald Turner and their like."). 
44. GARY SCHMIDGALL, THE STRANGER WILDE 181 (1994); see HYDE, OSCAR 
WILDE, supra note 4, at 187-88. 
45. HOLLAND, supra note 5, at 301 n.52; ELLMANN, supra note 11, at 441; HYDE, 
TRIALS, supra note 5, at 30. 
46. HOLLAND, supra note 5, at 175; HYDE, TRIALS, supra note 5, at 129. 
47. HYDE, TRIALS, supra note 5, at 8. 
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cation almost anything Humphreys might have heard from him. This is trag-
ic because it may be that Wilde's lie to Humphreys resulted from nothing 
more than Wilde's social embarrassment: Bernard Shaw, who knew him, 
said that Wilde was a snob.48 There are other possible explanations. It has 
been remarked that, as Wilde "became more prosperous, he became more 
preposterous,"49 and it has been asked whether he was "so tired of his pre-
sent existence that he did not mind what happened."50 Sir John Mortimer, 
Q.C., creator ofRumpole, has written: 
Did [Wilde] somehow feel that his huge success had become unbearable and want 
to destroy it? Was he attracted by the danger of lying and thought he could get 
away with it? Or was he, as I believe, a confused and kindly man who did not 
think, as we would not think nowadays, that he had done anything wrong and that 
he could rely on his irresistible charm, and his talent for finding clever answers to 
tricky questions to see him through?51 
These possibilities are echoed in a comment of Hesketh Pearson, au-
thor of one of the most interesting of the Wilde biographies, who perceived 
"a strange innocence or unknowingness in [Wilde's] most questionable be-
haviour."52 Wilde's son, Vyvyan, recorded that his father "lived in a world 
of his own; an artificial world, perhaps, but a world in which the only things 
that really mattered were art and beauty in all their forms."53 Wilde's grand-
son, Merlin Holland, suggests that Wilde took on Queensberry "hoping he 
could get away with it simply because of who he was."54 
Whether it was embarrassment that drove Wilde to tell the lie or na-
Ivete or a feeling of invincibility, perhaps borne of arrogance, or an overly 
optimistic appraisal of the impact of his wit is neither here nor there for 
present purposes. For present purposes, the Wilde story is important for its 
outcome. An unparalleled talent was destroyed, and a life was shortened/5 
48. HARRIS, supra note 27, at 18-19, 26. A Shaw biographer records that Shaw's 
view was that "success brought out the snob in Wilde." MICHAEL HOLROYD, BERNARD SHAW, 
1918-1950 THE LURE OF FANTASY 192 (1991). Robert Ross shared the snobbery assessment. 
See HYDE, OSCAR WILDE, supra note 4, at II. 
49. PEARSON, supra note 7, at 244. 
50. RENIER, supra note 5, at 105. 
51. HOLLAND, supra note 5, at xiii. 
52. PEARSON, supra note 7, at 264. HYDE, OSCAR WILDE, supra note 4, at 195 (re-
counting a conversation between Wilde and Andre Gide in January 1895 during which Gide 
asked Wilde whether Wilde knew the risk he ran in helping Douglas oppose his father, to 
which Wilde is said to have answered: "It is best never to know"); HOLLAND, supra note 5, at 
xxxv, relates the conversation differently, quoting Wilde as saying: "I have to go as far as 
possible." 
53. V. HOLLAND, supra note 7, at 43. 
54. MERLIN HOLLAND, COFFEE WITH OSCAR WILDE 10 (2007). And see HOLLAND, 
supra note 5, at xxxiv, where it is said that Wilde believed "he was in some way immune 
from the law." 
55. See WRJGHT, supra note 30, at 299. 
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just because of Wilde's foolish decision not to tell Humphreys what had to 
be said. 
I relate this story as pitiful proof of the need to protect confidentiality 
of communications between lawyers and their clients and to maintain the 
lawyer-client privilege in order to promote, even if not to ensure, access to 
informed and objective legal advice. I relate the story to show why the law-
yer-client privilege is sacrosanct, why the privilege has been said by my 
country's highest court to be both in the public interest56 and almost invio-
late, "all but" or "near" absolute. 57 I refer to the privilege being necessary in 
the public interest for a reason I have given elsewhere,58 which is that the 
privilege is an essential incident of the duty of loyalty all lawyers owe their 
clients, loyalty being the indispensable attribute of lawyer independence. 59 
II. PROMOTING LAWYER INDEPENDENCE INTERN A TTONALL Y 
And so I shift from privilege to a discussion of the earnestness with 
which the need for lawyer independence must be expressed. Recently, in 
unexpected places, including England and Australia, governments have 
restricted or have positioned themselves to restrict the capacity of lawyers to 
act independently in their clients' interests. 60 These developments have led 
me to question whether the case for (and for that matter against) lawyer 
independence is being made. I am not a legal academic. I spend most of my 
time serving clients in my capacity as a practicing lawyer, so my quest for a 
pure form of lawyer independence is my avocation. My research methodol-
ogy may not meet academic standards, but I am not wholly inept, and I can 
certainly google as well as anyone.61 For over three years, I have made my 
56. See, e.g., Can. (Privacy Comm'r) v. Blood Tribe Dep't of Health, 2 S.C.R. 574, 
para 9 (2008) ("[A] lawyer's advice is only as good as the factual information the client 
provides."). 
57. Ont. (Pub. Safety & Sec.) v. Criminal Lawyers' Ass'n I S.C.R. 815, paras. 53 & 
54 (2010). 
58. Gordon Turriff, Q.C., The Consumption of Lawyer Independence, 17 TNT'L J. 
LEGAL PROF. 283, 290-91 (20 I 0). 
59. The Supreme Court of Canada has said that the "integrity of the administration 
of justice" requires litigants to be assured of their lawyers' "undivided loyalty"; otherwise, 
the litigants (and "the public") will regard the legal system as unreliable and untrustworthy. 
SeeR. v. Neil, 3 S.C.R. 631, para. 12 (2002). 
60. I canvassed the English and Australian reforms in The Consumption of Lawyer 
Independence. Turriff, supra note 58, at 284-88. 
61. I googled "lawyer independence" in the summer of2011. What turned up was a 
list of attorneys working in Independence, Missouri. I googled "independence of the bar." 
What turned up was a list of drinking establishments in Independence, Missouri. My re-
search is more hunt and peck than scientific method, but it appears that it has to be because I 
have been told by a regular contributor to the academic literature in relation to legal ethics 
and the legal profession that there is no central index of books and journal articles about 
lawyer independence and regulation of lawyers. The Centre for the Legal Profession at the 
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searches, aiming to discover who around the world is thinking carefully 
about lawyer independence and about what I believe is its necessary con-
nection with the self-regulation oflawyers. Naturally, I have wondered, how 
might the law schools be treating these topics? I have also wondered wheth-
er international organizations that proclaim the importance of the rule of law 
are specifically concerned about lawyer independence, and, if they are, 
whether they advocate self-governance of lawyers to secure it? At the same 
time, I brought together a small group of Canadian lawyers, including a law 
professor and a former president of the Federation of Law Societies of Can-
ada, and with encouragement from observers, including the Chief Justices in 
British Columbia and Queensland, incorporated the International Society for 
the Promotion of the Public Interest of Lawyer Independence (ISPPILI). 
The formal objects of the ISPPILI are: 
I. to strengthen civil society by promoting lawyer independence as an essential 
element of the rule of law; and 
2. to research, develop and promote common international standards for the regu-
lation oflawyers. 
In the paper that resulted from my presentation to a lawyer regulation 
conference in London in June 2010, which I called The Consumption of 
Lawyer Independence,62 I anticipated the creation of the ISPPILI by saying 
that what the case for lawyer independence required was "a coordinated 
international effort by lawyers and judges to reclaim ... lost [independence] 
ground and to forestall future incursions."63 I said that: "It is not enough for 
independence advocates to depend on laudable efforts of human rights ac-
tivists who pursue the causes of lawyers whose claims of independence 
have been ignored. The change has to be cultural and structural, with purity 
of independent regulation as the international standard. "64 
The ISPPILI aims to identify people and organizations worldwide who 
support the cause of lawyer independence, to bring those supporters togeth-
er in a network, and to operate as a clearing-house for their ideas. The socie-
ty aims to educate people worldwide about the critical importance of pre-
University of Toronto has published lists of articles and books relating to professionalism but 
it appears from the lists that the Centre is not particularly concerned with independence or 
regulation. See Journals and Presentations, CENTRE FOR LEGAL PROF., clp.utoronto.ca/re 
source/journals-and-other-publications; Articles, CENTRE FOR LEGAL PROF., clp.utoronto.ca/ 
resources/articles; Books, CENTRE FOR LEGAL PROF., clp.utoronto.ca/resources/books. Nor, as 
my website searches have revealed, are the (U.S.) National Institute for Teaching Ethics and 
Professionalism, National Institute for Teaching Ethics and Professionalism, GA. ST. U. C. 
L., law.gsu.edu/nifteb, or the Center on the Global Legal Profession in the Maurer School of 
Law at Indiana University, Center on the Global Legal Profession, IND. U. MAURER SCH. L., 
law.indiana.edu/centers/global-profession.shtml. 
62. Turriff, supra note 58. 
63. !d. at 298. 
64. /d. 
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serving lawyer independence as a necessary incident (or, as Lord Bingham 
said, "ingredient"65) of the rule of law and to defend against the assault on 
independence by governments who claim the power to regulate when they 
don't understand, or perhaps don't want to admit, that lawyer independence 
is inevitably undermined by government participation in lawyer regulation. 
The ISPPILI also aims to help lawyers worldwide who are not independent 
to advocate for independence and self-regulation and to help those lawyers 
claim their independence and organize themselves as self-regulators. And 
the society aims to articulate and encourage the adoption of common stand-
ards for lawyer regulation that will secure and maintain public confidence in 
lawyers as regulators of independent lawyers in the public interest. 
My motivation in causing the incorporation of the ISPPILI was to 
make independence of lawyers a true subject of debate; to elevate the case 
for independence above what academic lawyers have typically dismissed as 
rhetoric;66 and to improve the quality of discussion about self-regulation, 
which appears to be dominated by two propositions most academic lawyers 
uncritically accept, namely, that lawyers cannot be trusted to regulate them-
selves and that when they do so they always do so ineptly and badly. What 
concerns me is that the anti-independence developments in England and 
Australia, canvassed in my London paper, occurred without any debate 
about the implications for lawyer independence of a loss of the capacity to 
self-regulate. How could that debate not have occurred, particularly when 
Professor (now Professor Sir) Jeffrey Jowell, Q.C., the director of London's 
Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law, has reminded us that "it is unrealistic 
to believe that violations of the rule of law are the preserve of 'far away' 
countries?"67 
Ill. LAW SCHOOL INTEREST IN LAWYER INDEPENDENCE AND REGULATION 
OF LAWYERS 
I have asked myself: are law students, who tend not to read journal ar-
ticles unless they have to, learning from their course work that lawyer inde-
65. TOM BINGHAM, THE RULEOFLAW37 (2010). 
66. See, e.g., Turriff, supra note 58, at 289. 
67. This statement was made at the launch in London, on December 6, 2010, of the 
Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law of the British Institute oflntemational and Comparative 
Law. The full text of Sir Jeffrey's talk that day was available at biicl.orglbinghamcentre 
through the summer of 20 II but the text appears to have been removed from the website. As 
of December 8, 20 II, the site included a video of the launch containing a version of Sir 
Jeffrey's remarks, but the passage I have quoted, and a good deal more of the address, had 
been edited out. See Launch of the Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law, BRITISH INST. OF 
INT'L AND COMPARATIVE LAW (Dec. 6, 2010), biicl.org/news/view/-/id/146. I have the full 
text of the talk on file. The remark I have quoted calls to mind SINCLAIR LEWIS, IT CAN'T 
HAPPEN HERE (1935). 
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pendence is or is not worth preserving? Are they being asked to consider 
whether lawyer independence is under attack? Are they being encouraged to 
think about whether direct or indirect government involvement in lawyer 
regulation is an attack? I tried to answer the question by looking for refer-
ences to lawyer independence and lawyer regulation in course descriptions 
published on law school websites in the United States and in England, Aus-
tralia, and Canada. I assumed, although now I wonder whether my assump-
tion was correct, that law deans and law professors devise course offerings 
that are intended to distinguish their schools from other providers of legal 
education and that they advertise their courses as attractively as possible, 
highlighting subjects that are likely to generate provocative discussions on 
vital public policy questions, discussions that would occur above the hum-
drum of issues of real property and corporate finance. I didn't choose the 
websites randomly, but I also didn't choose them because I thought they 
would produce a particular result. What I learned was that while it could not 
be said that academic lawyers are wholly ignoring lawyer independence and 
lawyer regulation as subjects of study, there is not much to indicate that the 
academy sees any reason to use either dissipating independence (or even the 
possibility of it), or government-lawyer tension over lawyer regulation, as 
hooks to attract students. 
On the Harvard site, I found a course described as covering, among 
other things, "the development of formal rules of professional conduct and 
other forms of regulation of lawyers' behavior."68 Another Harvard course 
advertised a discussion of "the difficulty in assuring quality and a strong 
consumer orientation in a subsidized delivery system."69 And a third prom-
ised to provide both "a look at the organization, economics, operation, and 
ideology of the legal profession," including a consideration of "professional 
autonomy, commercialism, and regulation (by clients, by the courts, and by 
regulatory agencies)" and an inquiry into "the effects of the regulation of 
legal practice on the organizations and institutions that deliver legal ser-
vices."70 Perhaps "professional autonomy" is the new "independence.'m 
Canadian academics Richard Devlin and Albert Cheng have also used that 
term, although it isn't clear why they or others believe that "independence" 
is a word to be avoided.72 Perhaps they think "independence" too powerfully 
68. See Legal Profession A2, HARVARD L. SCH., http://www.law.harvard.edu/acad 
emics/curriculum/catalog/index.html?o=54481 (last visited Feb. 8, 2012). 
69. See Legal Profession: Delivery of Legal Services A, HARVARD L. SCH., 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/academics/curriculum/catalog/index.html?o=54878 (last visited 
Feb. 8, 2012). 
70. See Legal Profession, HARVARD L. SCH., http://www.law.harvard.edu/academi 
cs/curriculum/catalog/index.html?o=39344 (last visited Feb. 8, 2012). 
71. !d. 
72. See Richard Devlin & Albert Cheng, Re-Calibrating, Re-Visioning and Re-
Thinking Self-Regulation in Canada, 17 lNT'L J. LEGAL PROF. 233,251 (2010). 
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conveys a notion they regard as questionable, although "autonomy" is pretty 
strong itself. 
The Yale site revealed a clinical course allowing students to "partici-
pate in the disciplinary process involving lawyers charged with violating 
ethical obligations to clients or other interested persons."73 Columbia offers 
a course about "the law and ethics of lawyering" whose topics include "con-
fidentiality, disclosure, conflicts of interest, litigation tactics, the regulation 
of the legal profession, the marketing of legal services, law firm structure, 
and professionalism problems and challenges."74 Columbia also offers a 
course dealing with, among other topics, "regulatory constraints on the or-
ganization and marketing of legal services" and "especially . . . with the 
application of client loyalty principles to organizational clients in situations 
where organizational constituencies are in conflict."75 I am not sure what 
that means but it may simply pose the question: what should a lawyer do to 
ensure that he or she knows from whom he or she must take instructions? 
Another Columbia course aims, "in a realistic setting," to address "govern-
ance" and "ownership" of large law firms. 76 The College of Law at Michi-
gan State University offers a course in professional responsibility that in-
cludes discussion of "disciplinary proceedings, the functions of Bar organi-
zations and unauthorized practice."77 Interestingly, the University of Michi-
gan lists a course called "In-House Counsel," "intended to examine a varie-
ty of legal and practice issues from the perspective of the in-house attor-
ney," including "the particular ethical obligations of an in-house attomey."78 
Strangely, nothing is said to suggest that students will be asked to think 
critically about whether in-house lawyers can, practically speaking, be inde-
pendent or whether, for the purposes of the lawyer-client privilege, they 
are.79 
73. Lawyering Ethics Clinic, YALE L. ScH., http://ylsinfo.law.yale.edu/wsw/prereg/ 
CourseDetails.asp?cClschedid= II 0854 (last visited July 6, 20 12). 
74. See Professional Responsibility, COLUM. L. SCH., http://www.law.columbia.edu 
/courses!L6274-professional-responsibility (last visited July 6, 20 12). 
75. See Professional Responsibility Issues in Business Practice, COLUM. L. SCH., 
http://www.law.columbia.edu/courses/L6362-professional-responsibility-issues-in-business-
practice (last visited Jan. 14, 2012). 
76. The Large Law Firm: Organization Operation Strategies and Issues, COLUM. L. 
ScH., http://www.law.columbia.edu/courses/L9364-the-Iarge-Iaw-firm-organization-
operation-strategies-and-issues (last visited Jan. 14, 2012). 
77. See Professional Responsibility, MICH. ST. U. C. OF L., law.msu/edu/academics 
/course_desc.php?cid=l4 (last visited Jan. 14, 2012). 
78. See In-House Counsel, U. OF MICH. L. ScH., http://web.law.umich.edu/ _Class 
Schedule/aboutCourse.asp?crse_id=042326 (last visited Jan. 14, 2012). 
79. !d. On the questions of independence and privilege, compare Pritchard v. Ont. 
Human Rights Comm'n, I S.C.R. 809 (2004), with Case C-550/07, Akzo Nobel Chemicals 
Ltd. v. European Comm 'n, http://curia.europa.eu (20 I 0). 
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At Oxford, post-graduate BCL students may choose a generic course 
called "Regulation" concerning "how modem states seek to govern the ac-
tivities of individual citizens as well as corporate and governmental actors," 
and which aims to analyze "how legal regulation constructs specific rela-
tionships between law and society and how legal regulation is involved in 
mediating conflicts between private and public power."80 A search for "in-
dependence of lawyers" and "regulation of lawyers" turned up nothing on 
the University of Westminster website and neither the University of Sussex 
nor the London School of Economics and Political Science sites revealed 
courses in which those topics appeared likely to be treated.81 
At Monash University, in the Australian state of Victoria, one course, 
called "Lawyers Ethics and Society," addresses, among other matters, "his-
tory, organisation, education, functions and regulation of lawyers in Victo-
ria and elsewhere; reform issues; nature and significance of a profession; 
independence of courts and lawyers. "82 Students are expected to emerge 
from the course with an understanding of "issues surrounding the regulation 
of the profession."83 The "issues" are left mysteriously undefined. Students 
at Bond University in Queensland can select a course described as covering 
"the traditions and regulation of the legal profession."84 At the Australian 
National University, students who successfully complete "Lawyers Justice 
and Ethics" "will be able to ... analyse the structure and workings of the 
legal profession from a range of perspectives" and to explain "the various 
forms of regulation of professional conduct."85 
In Canada, Dalhousie University's course on "The Legal Profession 
and Professional Responsibility" promises an exploration of "various as-
pects of the nature and organization of the legal profession" and "wider [but 
unarticulated] public protection issues which face the organized legal pro-
fession."86 Students at the University of Calgary can study "selected [but 
undisclosed] topics relating to the regulation of lawyers' ethics," and 
80. Overview, OXFORD, http://www.law.ox.ac.uk/subjecU37 (last visited Jan. 8, 
2012). 
81. See U. WESTMINSTER, courses.westminster.ac.uk/CourseSearch.aspx (last visited 
Jan 14, 2012); U. SussEx, sussex.ac.uk/study/ug/2012/1528/24715 (last visited Jan. 8, 2012); 
LLB Programme Objectives, LONDON SCH. ECON. & POL. Sci., http://www.lse.ac.uk/coll 
ections/law/programmes/llblllb-prospective.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2012). 
82. Undergraduate Unit, MONASH U., http://its.monash.edu.au/non-cms/staff/web/ 
Convert2PDF /uploads!PDFedLink9714.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 20 12). 
83. !d. 
84. BOND U., http://apps.bond.edu.au/subjects/subject-overview.asp?SubiD= Ill 
01_3 (last visited Jan.l4, 2012). 
85. Lawyers Justice and Ethics, AUSTRALIAN NAT'L U. C. L., http://law.anu.edu.au/ 
students/class.aspx?unitiD= 1413 (last visited Jan. 14, 20 12). 
86. The Legal Profession and Professional Responsibility, DALHOUSIE U., 
http://registrar.dal.ca/calendar/class.php?subj=LA WS&num=2099 (last visited Jan. 14, 
2012). 
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amongst the competencies expected of graduating students are an under-
standing of the function of the legal profession in society.87 The University 
of Victoria offers a course called "The Legal Profession," intended to pro-
vide students "with insights and perspectives into the organization and op-
eration of the legal profession as a vital institution in the legal process," 
including the "formal organization" of the profession.88 At the University of 
British Columbia, issues to be canvassed in an upper level course on "Pro-
fessional Responsibility" include "the self-regulation of the legal profes-
sion."89 
I don't want to overstate the significance of this little Internet journey. 
But it may be germane that my searches turned up only one mention of pro-
fessional autonomy and a single reference to each of lawyer independence 
and self-regulation. There was certainly nothing to suggest that any of the 
law schools I investigated offers a course devoted exclusively to the subject 
of lawyer independence or a course comparing systems of lawyer regulation 
worldwide. 
It isn't apparent from other searches I have made that very many legal 
academics are interested in lawyer independence. Many academics are con-
cerned about regulation of lawyers, particularly insofar as regulation serves 
to further the interests of consumers of legal services, but those thinkers 
don't appear to see any need to inquire into the question of whether con-
sumer protection should be preferred over lawyer independence. Why ha-
ven't academic lawyers embraced lawyer independence as a subject worthy 
of discrete attention? Why do they appear to be content to regard lawyer 
independence as a lawyers' game; to accept that all lawyer independence 
questions were answered satisfactorily years ago and need not be re-visited; 
and to conclude that lawyer independence is an outmoded concept? Why, 
especially when lawyer regulation has been radically altered in England and 
Australia, and when changes are expected elsewhere?90 
As I have mentioned here and as I said in my London paper, academic 
lawyers have regularly dismissed as "rhetoric" arguments advanced by law-
yer independence advocates. 91 In the London paper, I gave four examples I 
had encountered.92 It had seemed curious to me that four authors at different 
87. See Statement of Competencies, U. OF CALGARY, http://law.ucalgary.ca/prosp 
ectivestudents/JDprogram/competencies (last visited Jan. 14, 20 12). 
88. Law 360: The Legal Profession, U. OF VICTORIA, http://web.uvic.ca/cale 
ndar20 11 /CDs/LA W /360.html (last visited Jan. 14, 20 12). 
89. U OF BRIT. COLUM., http://www.law.ubc.ca/files/pdf/currenUjd/web_files/Course 
_ Descriptions/Course_description_report.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 20 12). 
90. See, e.g., Carol Coulter, Legal Reforms Represent Attack on Independence, THE 
IRISH TIMES (Nov. 14, 2011), http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/opinion/2011/1114/ 
1224307524807 .html. 
91. Turriff, supra note 58, at 289. 
92. /d. 
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times and in different places would all reach for the same word. Now, and 
without searching particularly for them, I have noticed four further instances 
from four different academic writers. Thus, we have lawyers "typically in-
vok[ing] the rhetoric of autonomous control over their work";93 we are told 
of facts that might demonstrate that "lawyers and judges are not doing what 
the rhetoric and assumptions claim they must do in order to be legitimate 
regulators";94 we learn of "rhetoric opposing regulation protecting consum-
ers of legal services";95 and we read Rhetoric and Realities: What Independ-
ence of the Bar Requires of Lawyer Regulation.96 
Has the academy's rhetoric argument become the academy's rhetoric? 
Why is the subject of independence for the most part shrugged off? Why 
haven't academic lawyers re-assessed the case for lawyer independence, 
and the arguably embedded case for lawyer self-regulation, in the face of 
the momentum for regulatory change that has built since the publication of 
the Clementi report in England and Wales in 2004 ?97 Why is the claim that 
lawyers should regulate lawyers presumed to be indefensible? Where is the 
theoretical refutation of the case for lawyer independence? Where is the 
empirical evidence that regulation of lawyers by lawyers does not satisfac-
torily serve the long-term public interest? 
My own experience as a public interest regulator of lawyers is that 
self-governance and the public interest can co-exist very satisfactorily. Let 
me give just one example by which readers might begin to measure the ef-
fectiveness and value of self-regulation. In 2009, when I spoke as president 
93. Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 8 (1988); 
See also id at 7 (another reference to "rhetoric"). 
94. David Bamhizer, Abandoning an "Unethical" System of Legal Ethics, 2012 
MICH. ST. L. REv. 375, n.34. 
95. Duncan Webb, Are Lawyers Regulatable?, 45 ALTA. L. REv. 233, 243 (2008). 
96. Woolley, Rhetoric, supra note 3. 
97. See Sir David Clementi, Review of the Regulatory Framework for Legal Services 
in England and Wales, LEGAL SERVS. REv. (2004), available at http://www.legal-services-
review.org.uk. The English and Australian reforms have generated scholarship in the United 
States but the focus of the American writers I have encountered is consumerism and the 
effect of the changes on the business of law. At best, if the subjects of lawyer independence, 
and the effect on independence of the loss of the capacity of lawyers to govern themselves, 
are considered at all, they are dealt with peripherally and incidentally. See, e.g., Judith L. 
Maute, Bar Associations, Self-Regulation and Consumer Protections: Whither Though 
Goest? 2008 J. PROF. LAWYER 53 (2008); Laurel S. Terry, The Future Regulation of the 
Legal Profession: The Impact of Treating the Legal Profession as "Service Providers", 2008 
J. PROF. LAWYER 189 (2008); Ted Schneyer, Thoughts on the Compatibility of Recent U.K. 
and Australian Reforms with U.S. Traditions in Regulating Law Practice, 2009 J. PROF. 
LAWYER 13 (2009). Professor Terry, for example, first mentions the "autonomy and inde-
pendence of the legal profession" in the penultimate paragraph of her long article and, in her 
penultimate footnote, suggests that the legal profession might justify its exclusion from out-
side regulation by reference to "the fragility of 'the rule of law,"' but she doesn't take the 
matter further. Terry, supra at 210,211 n.l08. 
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of the Law Society of British Columbia at a Rotary Club meeting in a sub-
urb of Vancouver, I reported that the lawyers who regulate British Colum-
bia's lawyers in the public interest (they do so with some lay assistance but 
without government participation) had, without legal compulsion and be-
cause they believed it was the right thing to do, required wholly innocent 
lawyers to contribute a total amount of $38 million (including available 
insurance proceeds) to recompense the client victims of a British Columbia 
lawyer who had been party to a complicated real estate fraud. On hearing 
my report of what the lawyer regulators had done, my Rotary audience ap-
plauded spontaneously. 
Why haven't academic lawyers re-examined their premises? I don't 
mean to denigrate their work, as far as it goes, and I couldn't over-
emphasize how important their research and thinking might be, as it relates 
to lawyer independence and self-regulation, if they undertook the work. As I 
told one of them recently, independent self-regulating lawyers will certainly 
respond to appropriate suggestions from overseers, even if they decide in 
the public interest to reject the ideas, and they will certainly review the ef-
fectiveness of their regulatory work if scholars have thoughtfully criticized 
their regulatory performance. Self-regulators, at least Canada's self-
regulators, are constantly reviewing their work in any event. My concern is 
that many academics seem unable to avoid the temptation of hurdling the 
independence questions. They typically leap straight into a discussion of the 
inadequacy of lawyer self-regulation. They harvest the low-hanging fruit, 
relating stories of imperfect lawyers; suggesting, without proving, that the 
imperfections result from self-governance; and ignoring the independence 
implications of regulation by government, by government appointees, or by 
lawyer-government partnerships. 
It is easy, everywhere, to identify lawyers who have not taken care to 
define their relationships with their own clients; who have not listened as 
carefully as they should have to what their clients were really saying; who 
have not appropriately comprehended their clients cases; who have pursued 
hopeless claims; who have acted uncivilly towards clients or opponents; and 
who have charged their clients more than they should have. It is easy, eve-
rywhere, even to find some examples of lawyers who have stolen their cli-
ents' money. But what academic lawyers and other critics have not shown is 
that conduct of the sort I have described is so prevalent amongst lawyers 
and so damaging to clients-that "customer service" is so bad-that it justi-
fies dispensing with lawyer independence as an essential ingredient of the 
rule of law. Moreover, what academic lawyers and other critics have not 
shown is that regulators other than lawyers would regulate perfectly, or 
even more satisfactorily than lawyers do. 
Is there really a case for enhanced "consumer protection" in place of 
the protections independent lawyers guarantee? Consider this: there are 
roughly 10,000 practicing lawyers in British Columbia. If in their practice 
The Importance of Being Earnestly Independent 297 
lives each of them made ten client decisions a day on each of 200 days in a 
year, the total number of decisions in that year would be 20 million. How 
many of those decisions (and a lot of them would have been judgment calls) 
are likely to have been wrong? How many of the decisions are likely to 
have harmed clients' interests? How many of the decisions are likely to 
have been motivated by lawyer fraud? Probably the answer is a few hundred 
wrong; fewer that caused harm; and only a tiny few, probably no more than 
a handful, that constituted fraud. The other 19.999 million plus decisions 
will probably have helped people to live better lives, even if only in little 
ways. There is the social utility in having lawyers in all our communities. 
And the fact is that the fraudsters in British Columbia are always disbarred, 
actually or effectively, and I think I am right in reporting that there is no 
instance of British Columbia's lawyer self-regulators ever having re-
admitted a disbarred lawyer (although it would be wrong for me to say it 
could never happen). Having said that, older British Columbia lawyers do 
recall that a lawyer who had been disbarred for having committed a serious 
criminal offence was re-admitted after his conviction was overturned at 
court. 
Should we incur the inestimable cost of the loss of lawyer independ-
ence in order to try to win some short-term, relatively small consumer victo-
ries? 
I return to the questions. Why don't most academic lawyers who think 
about the legal profession think about lawyer independence? Why don't 
they think about the relationship between independence and regulation? Do 
they really believe that lawyers need not be independent? That independ-
ence is achievable without self-regulation? That of all groups in our com-
munities who should be regulated there isn't a special case to be made for 
lawyer self-regulation? That regulation of lawyers by lawyers is a privi-
lege?98 That lawyers are innately incapable of regulating themselves in the 
98. Gordon, supra note 93, at 7, assumes that it is, or at least does not suggest that it 
is something else. In a speech at the Canadian Bar Association 2011 Annual Conference, in 
Halifax, Nova Scotia, on August 14, 2011, David Johnston, the Governor General of Canada 
(a former law dean), urged lawyers to meet their "obligations under the social contract[]" and 
said that, if they didn't, their "self-regulatory privilege" would be diminished or removed. 
David Johnston, Canadian Bar Association's Canadian Legal Conference - The Legal Pro-
fession in a Smart and Caring Nation: A Vision for 2017, GG.CA (Aug. 14, 2011), 
http://gg.ca/document.aspx?id=l4195. His Excellency also said that lawyers "enjoy a mo-
nopoly to practise law." /d. Regrettably, by referring to the Canadian Bar Association and to 
Canada's "provincial and territorial law societies" in the same paragraph, without explaining 
their separate functions as, respectively, advocate and regulator, he wrongly suggested that 
the CBA is involved in the governance of the legal profession in Canada. /d. For an argument 
that lawyer independence is a constitutional value, see Roy Millen, The Independence of the 
Bar: An Unwritten Constitutional Principle, 84 CAN. BAR REv. 107 (2005). See also Turriff, 
supra note 58, at 291; Woolley, Rhetoric, supra note 3, at 2. For an argument that lawyers do 
not "enjoy" a monopoly in order to further their interests and that our communities reserve 
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public interest? That government or court regulation would not diminish 
independence? That "co-regulation"99 serves the public interest? Are aca-
demic lawyers just not interested in independence? Is it just so much 
pablum for them? Are independence and self-regulation not topics of suffi-
cient urgency? Do academic lawyers think that sufficient numbers of their 
colleagues are already engaged with the subjects? Do they think there is just 
nothing more to be said? Am I unfair to suggest that academic critics may 
be reluctant to be seen by colleagues, deans, funders, and prospective em-
ployers as advocating for lawyers by promoting lawyer independence and 
self-regulation, even though, arguably, they would be advocating for the 
public interest? 100 
IV. LAWYER INDEPENDENCE, REGULATION OF LA WYERS, AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
In my exploration of the politics of lawyer independence, I also sur-
veyed websites of many international organizations, including lawyer advo-
cacy groups. It is astonishing to see how much good work is being done 
internationally by groups committed to the advancement of the rule of law, 
especially in respect of the preservation of human rights. It is equally aston-
ishing, at least for me, to learn that lawyer independence is not apparently 
regarded as a subject deserving of discrete inquiry or treatment. 101 Under-
standably, the energies and resources of well-intentioned proponents of the 
rule of law are marshalled to deal with terrible human rights abuses causing 
immediate harm to countless people around the world. These rule of law 
champions have lofty goals. However, they may be trying to do too much, 
with the result that their achievements are inevitably diffuse. For example, 
work to lawyers in the public interest, see Turriff, supra note 58, at 295. Perhaps the Gover-
nor General should be excused for his assumptions (if they are not mistakes) because even 
Peter Hogg, Canada's leading scholar of constitutional law, does not consider lawyer inde-
pendence to be a subject worthy of inquiry, despite regarding independence of judges as 
"deeply rooted" and as "such a powerful tradition." PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
OF CANADA, 7-8, 7-9, (5th ed., 2007). His treatment of lawyer independence consists of a 
footnote reference to the Millen article. /d. at 15-53 n.267. 
99. See, e.g., Paul D. Paton, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Future of Self-
Regulation-Canada Between the United States and the English/Australian Experience, 2008 
J. PROF. LAWYER 104 (2008). 
100. I am not ignoring the six academic papers that form part of In the Public Inter-
est, which contains the 2007 report of the Law Society of Upper Canada's task force on the 
rule of law and the independence of the bar. See LAW SOC'Y OF UPPER CAN., IN THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST: THE REPORT AND RESEARCH PAPERS OF THE LAW SOCIETY OF UPPER CANADA'S 
TASK FORCE ON THE RULE OF LAW AND THE INDEPENDENCE (2007). Those papers did not 
emerge from the academy unprompted: they were commissioned by the Society,-owing to a 
"dearth ofliterature." /d. at 40. 
101. Not even by Lord Bingham, whose discussion of lawyer independence as an 
element of the rule of law is just over three lines long. BINGHAM, supra note 65, at 92-93. 
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in 2007 and 2008, the World Justice Project sponsored a scholarship pro-
gramme comprising "two internationally diverse teams of scholars from the 
fields of law, economics, political science and anthropology."102 The first 
team "developed a body of scholarship examining the relationship between 
the rule of law and economic, political, and social development." The sec-
ond team "prepared a series of comparative studies on how marginalized 
groups obtain access to justice."103 This is all very well, and it is undoubted-
ly helpful if linked to practical, obtainable results, but in the meantime what 
disinterested people or groups aim to support the rule of law by ensuring 
that independent lawyers learn how to govern themselves in the public in-
terest? 
The American Bar Association reports that its worldwide Rule of Law 
Initiative "helps legal professional associations, including special interest 
bar associations, develop into sustainable organizations, which can train 
their members while advocating on their behalf."104 It is not surprising that 
the ABA would promote the establishment of lawyer interest groups given 
that the Association's first goal is to serve its members by promoting their 
"professional growth and quality of life."105 It is interesting to note that 
preservation of "the independence of the legal profession" is only the fifth 
part of the Association's fourth goal. 106 Of course, the issue is credibility 
and legitimacy. How can the ABA be regarded as a promoter of the public 
interest of lawyer independence when it is, fundamentally, a group that rep-
resents the interests oflawyers? Similarly, the Human Rights Institute of the 
International Bar Association "supports bar associations and law societies 
worldwide through long-term capacity building prograrnrnes."107 But while, 
like the ABA, the IBA supports lawyer independence, arguably it cannot be 
a credible promoter of lawyer independence or of regulation of lawyers by 
lawyers (if it believes that self-regulation is necessary) as long as it is or is 
seen to be "the global voice of the legal profession."108 In any event, neither 
the ABA nor the IBA appears to have made regulation of lawyers a focal 
point of their bar association development work. If they did, one of the first 
I 02. See Scholarship, THE WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, http://worldjusticeproject.org/ 
scholarship (last visited Jan. 22, 2012). 
103. !d. 
104. ABA Rule of Law Initiative - Legal Profession Reform, AM. BAR Ass'N, 
http://apps.americanbar.org/rol/programs/legal-profession.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2012). 
105. Association Goals, AM. BAR Ass'N, http://americanbar.org/utility/about_ 
the_ aha/association _goals.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2012). 
106. !d. 
107. IBAHRI Projects with Bars and Law Societies, INT'L BAR Ass'N, 
http://www.ibanet.org/barassociations/HRI _Bar _Projects.aspx (last visited Jan. 23, 20 12) 
(emphasis omitted). 
108. See INT'L BAR Ass'N, http://www.ibanet.org/Default.aspx (last visited Jan. 23, 
2012). 
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lessons they would have to teach is that the associations should not at the 
same time advocate for lawyers and claim to regulate them in the public 
interest. The ABA's failure to separate the representational and regulatory 
functions may be understandable if the American Law Institute has reported 
accurately, at least for the United States, that "bar associations [which must 
mean representational groups] have become the chief embodiment of the 
concept that lawyers are a self-regulated profession."109 
In April 2010, Gabriela Carina Knaul de Albuquerque e Silva, the 
United Nations' Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and 
Lawyers, reported to the 14th session of the U.N. Human Rights Council 
that "lawyers must be aware of, and sensitive to, human rights standards, 
principles, rules and jurisprudence, international human rights systems and 
international and regional courts in order to strengthen democracy, the rule 
of law and good governance at the nationallevel."110 Ms. Knaul emphasized 
the need to ensure that judges and lawyers were suitably educated, because, 
as her predecessors had concluded, "appropriate legal education for judges 
and lawyers was ... a determining factor for their independence," but she 
did not raise the question of who must regulate lawyers to ensure that inde-
pendent advocates are always available to make the case for the protection 
of human rights. 111 
Recently, the International Commission of Jurists published a "Legal 
Commentary" to its Geneva Declaration on Upholding the Rule of Law and 
the Role of Judges and Lawyers in Times ofCrisis. 112 The need for lawyers 
to uphold human rights and the rule of law was stressed and the need "to 
protect and strengthen the independence of the legal profession"113 was rec-
ognized, but curiously, at least to me, the underpinning for these declarative 
statements was the right lawyers have "to freedom of expression and associ-
ation."114 There was no mention of the argument-it is at least an arguable 
109. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS 9 (2000). It is inter-
esting to note that in the ALI book, which contains 1,100 pages of text in two volumes, there 
are only two index references to "self-regulation" and none to "independence." Canada's 
rough equivalent to the ALI book also treats the subject of lawyer independence scantly. See 
ADAM M. DODEK & JEFFREY G. HOSKINS, Q.C., CANADIAN LEGAL PRACTICE 3-5, 8-29 (2009) 
(there is a bold foreword by The Honorable Frank Iacobucci, C.C., Q.C., a former justice of 
the Supreme Court of Canada). 
110. Gabriela Carina Knau1 de Albuquerque e Silva, United Nations Gen. Assembly, 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers (2010), at 6, 
available at http://daccess-dds-ny .un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G 1 01126/22/PDF /G 1012622. 
pdf?OpenEiement. 
111. /d. at 6. 
112. Int'l Comm'n of Jurists, Legal Commentary to the ICJ Geneva Declaration, 
INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS 1 (2011), available at http://icj.org/dwn/database/GenevaComm 
entary-2011.pdf. 
113. /d. at 84. 
114. /d. 
The Importance of Being Earnestly Independent 301 
point-that lawyers have to regulate themselves, free from government en-
dorsement and not as partners with government, because, otherwise, to put 
it simply, independence is illusory. 
Where is the point, counter-point on the subject of lawyer independ-
ence and self-governance? Where are the reasoned exchanges about whether 
lawyers can be independent when they function under any degree of gov-
ernment direction, however the direction might be dressed up? My concern 
is that the subject, which is as ripe as it could be, is not really up for discus-
sion. For example, in May 2011, the International Bar Association pub-
lished its International Principles on Conduct for the Legal Profession, 115 
and while the Association stressed that "the guarantee of a lawyer's inde-
pendence is an essential requirement for the protection of citizens' rights in 
a democratic society"116 and while the Association concluded that 
"[l]awyers and bars should strive for and preserve the true independence of 
the legal profession,"117 it was said, without any commentary whatsoever, 
that "[t]here is an ongoing debate as to the extent to which governmental 
and legislative interference with the administration and conduct of the legal 
profession may be warranted."118 Where is that debate occurring? And why 
didn't the IBA say what issues were being addressed; who was inquiring 
into them; who was being consulted; and why there was no need to bring 
the debate to a boil, despite the force and impact of the politically powerful 
consumer rationalization for government interference?119 
115. INT'L BAR ASS'N, IBA INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLES ON CONDUCT FOR THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION I (2011), available at http://www.ibanet.org/Pub1ications/publications_IBA_ 
guides_ and_ free_ materials.aspx#ethics. 
116. Id. at 12. 
117. Id.at14. 
118. Id. 
119. Late in December 2011, two things happened that suggest that independence and 
self-governance are acquiring some international momentum. First, the Law Society of Ire-
land published a special issue of its Gazette, with a cover title of Rule of Law under Threat. 
Legal Independence and the Public Interest, containing the texts of presentations made at a 
conference held in Dublin on December 5, 2011, on the subject of"Why the Independence of 
the Legal Profession Must Be Defended in the Public Interest." See Rule of Law Under 
Threat: Legal Independence and the Public Interest, LAW SOCIETY GAZETTE, Dec. 2011, 
available at http://www.lawsociety .ie/Documents/Gazette/Gazette%2020 12/January20 12 _ 
GazetteSpecial.pdf. Three of the speakers were the executive director of the IBA, the presi-
dent of the ABA, and the incoming president of the Council of Bars and Law Societies of 
Europe (CCBE), the latter of which is the "representative organisation" of about one million 
European lawyers !d.; see also About Us, CCBE, http://www.ccbe.eu/index.php?id= 
375&L=O (last visited Feb. 19, 2012). That roster leads me to wonder whether any of the 
Irish Law Society (which is both a regulatory and representative body, see About Us, LAW 
SociETY OF IRELAND, http://www.lawsociety.ie/Pages/About-Us/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2012), 
the IBA, the ABA, and the CCBE understand that their legitimacy on the independence and 
self-governance question is undermined by their being lawyer interest groups). Second, on 
December 21, 20 II, the then president of the CCBE and the president of the ABA jointly 
wrote the managing director of the International Monetary Fund expressing concern over the 
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V. THE NEED TO ENCOURAGE A LAWYER INDEPENDENCE DEBATE 
Perhaps we don't know what we mean by lawyer independence. Per-
haps lawyer independence, whatever it is, just isn't that important. Perhaps 
it has outlived its usefulness. Perhaps its death is an unavoidable conse-
quence of globalization. Perhaps we've talked ourselves into wrongly be-
lieving we can't do without the rule of law-or, as a cynical observer might 
put it, "the rule of good laws." Perhaps the rule of law and lawyer inde-
pendence are completely unrelated. Perhaps self-regulation of lawyers is a 
privilege, not a constitutional imperative. Perhaps judicial independence 
doesn't depend on lawyer independence. Perhaps we don't need experi-
enced and specially trained legal advocates. Perhaps, by deregulation, we 
should define lawyers out of existence. Perhaps market efficiency should 
prevail over all other considerations. Perhaps the value of lawyers' work 
really can be measured by the "quantile regression model.'mo Perhaps we 
can trust government implicitly. Perhaps government really could regulate 
lawyers satisfactorily. Perhaps government-appointed boards of leading and 
specially skilled citizens could regulate effectively while keeping govern-
ment in tow. Perhaps the recent regulatory changes in England and Austral-
ia, and the proposed changes in Ireland121 and the Netherlands, 122 can be 
independence implications of the IMF tying reform of the legal profession to provision of 
aid. See European and US Lawyers Alert the IMF Against Troika-imposed Reforms Affecting 
the Independence of the Profession in "Bail-out" Countries, CCBE, http://www.ccbe.eu/file 
admin!user_upload/NTCdocument/PR_on_CCBEABA_lette1_1325761475.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 19, 2012); ABA and European Lawyers Alert /MF of Potential Threats to Independence 
of the Legal Profession, ABA Now, http://www.abanow.org/2012/01/aba-and-european-
lawyers-alert-imf-of-potential-threats-to-independence-of-the-Iegal-profession/ (last visited 
Feb. 19, 2012). 
120. See CLIFFORD WINSTON, ROBERT W. CRANDALL & VIKRAM MAHESHRI, FIRST 
THING WE DO, LET'S DEREGULATE ALL THE LAWYERS 40 (2011). The authors are "regulatory 
economists." ld at 7. They acknowledge that American lawyers play a "vital role" "in sup-
porting democratic institutions, protecting individual rights, and the like." ld at 8. But they 
do not mention lawyer independence and they do not say whether government involvement 
in regulation of lawyers might affect that vital role or how the role might be affected by 
deregulation of lawyers, which they propose. They report that "regulation of the legal ser-
vices industry in Japan reflects the interests of the government and major consumers of those 
services more than the interests of members of the bar," without commenting on the signifi-
cance of government regulatory involvement, other than to say that Japanese lawyers may be 
a less successful interest group than are lawyers in the United States. !d. at 28. Curiously, 
they refer to U.S. lawyers having to obtain a "government license" to practice their profes-
sion. ld at 1. I suppose they are technically correct because the courts are a branch of "gov-
ernment." 
121. See, e.g., Coulter, supra note 90, see also Not Even Zimbabwe Has a Model Like 
This, LAW SOCIETY GAZETTE, Nov. 2011 at 12. Both are reactions to a proposed Legal Ser-
vices Regulation Bill 2011. For another reaction, see Gordon Turriff, Q.C., The Price of 
Capitulation, LAW SOCIETY GAZETTE, Dec. 2011, at 18-19. 
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ignored or should be copied. Perhaps these changes don't or won't affect 
lawyer independence at all. 
There are so many questions. Who should appropriately decide what 
academic background aspiring lawyers must have? Which law schools, if 
any, they must have attended? What courses they must have studied? What 
training they must complete? What character they must display? Who 
should decide with whom, whether lawyers are not, lawyers can associate in 
practice and in what combinations? Who must or might suitably say which 
clients lawyers can serve? Which courts lawyers can address? Which law-
suits lawyers can prosecute and defend? Which issues they can raise? 
Which arguments they can make? Who must or might satisfactorily deter-
mine what sensible rules lawyers must follow and what professional stand-
ards they must meet? When and how they should be disciplined and with 
what consequences? What insurance they must have against their mistakes? 
What trust protections clients might need? Perhaps it's merely a matter of 
who controls the decision-making. Perhaps it isn't. Perhaps none of this is 
aU-or-nothing. 
For now, because I haven't been persuaded otherwise and because 
there is so much at stake, I think I'm right to be a vigorous promoter of law-
yer independence and of regulation of lawyers by lawyers, and to be cate-
gorical in the statement of my position. I acknowledge that I am at what I 
call the pure end of the lawyer-independence spectrum. My fellow ISPPILI 
directors take care to rein me in. Perhaps they're right and that I needn't be 
such a "zealous advocate." 123 But, as I tell them, I'm open to being persuad-
ed that I need not strive for the ideal. And I'd rather be proved wrong than 
right about expressing concern. 
I hope I'm not naive. I hope I understand the complexities of the real 
world. I hope I'm not unrealistic in believing that lawyer independence, in 
any useful state of purity, will not survive unless it quickly comes to be re-
garded as an inescapable subject for separate study. If I am right about 
where lawyers should place themselves on the independence spectrum, then 
I think that, as much as it is important to ensure that the quality of lawyer 
regulation is high, it is more important to recognize that worldwide ac-
ceptance of and adherence to the rule of law is not achievable without truly 
independent lawyers. I think it is essential that discussions about lawyer 
independence and self-governance not be side-tracked by discussions about 
122. See a report that the government of the Netherlands "has published a draft law 
under which lawyers will be supervised by a board of three non-lawyers"; Jonathan Gold-
smith, Lawyers Must Take the Lead in Reshaping Our Values, LAW SOCIETY GAZETTE, Sept. 
29, 2011, http://www .lawgazette.co.uk/opinion!state-union/lawyers-must -take-lead-reshapi 
ng-our-values. Mr. Goldsmith is the secretary general of the CCBE. See Structure: Secretar-
iat, CCBE, http://www.ccbe.eu/index.php?id= 18&L=O. 
123. Woolley, Rhetoric, supra note 3, at 4. 
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the quality of regulation, although I don't suggest that quality is not a criti-
cally important subject. 124 Two Canadian law professors, Richard Devlin, 
whom I have mentioned, and Alice Woolley, have recently acknowledged 
that, at least for some accomplishments, regulation of lawyers by lawyers in 
Canada should be applauded, even if it could certainly be improved. 125 
Devlin has called self-regulation in Canada "increasingly muscular"126 and 
he has remarked on Canada's "increasingly robust and proactive regulatory 
strategies, going well beyond conventional regulatory practices to ambi-
tious, challenging and sometimes innovative initiatives,"127 even if he has 
unaccountably called the recent developments "defensive,"128 when he 
might just as well have called them "responsive." Woolley remarks on the 
"undoubtedly great accomplishments" of Canada's lawyer self-regulators129 
and she accepts that lawyer independence in Canada is constitutionally pro-
tected, 130 but she, like Devlin, does not agree with me that self-regulation is 
a necessary condition of independence. As far as I can tell, Woolley's ina-
bility to accept that self-regulation is a necessary condition of independ-
ence131 derives from her assumption and insistence that, even if lawyers who 
regulated themselves strove to regulate themselves in the public interest, 
anyone else would necessarily do a better job of it. Someone should demon-
strate that that is so, or not so. 132 And someone should prove, or disprove, 
that something less than perfect regulation is the unavoidable cost of lawyer 
independence. 
124. "Which leads to the more fundamental point: far more important than the ques-
tion of who regulates lawyers is the question of how and in what way lawyers are regulated." 
ALICE WOOLLEY, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS IN CANADA 9 (2011) [hereinafter 
UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS IN CANADA]. Why more important, much less far more 
important? 
125. Devlin & Cheng, supra note 72, at 234, 262-263; see also UNDERSTANDING 
LAWYERS' ETHICS IN CANADA, supra note 124, at 8. 
126. Devlin & Cheng, supra note 72, at 234. 
127. ld. at247. 
128. Jd. at257. 
129. UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS IN CANADA, supra note 124, at 8. 
130. Woolley, Rhetoric, supra note 3, at I. 
131. See UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS IN CANADA, supra note 124, at 7; Rich-
ard F. Devlin & Porter Heffernan, The End(s) of Self-Regulation?, 45 ALBERTA L. REV. 169, 
192 (2008). Cf Gordon Turriff, Q.C., A Speech at the Conference of Regulatory Officers, 
Perth, Australia: Self Governance as a Necessary Condition of Constitutionally Mandated 
Lawyer Independence in British Columbia (Sept. 17, 2009), available at 
http://www.lawsociety.bc.ca/docs/publications/reports/turriff-speech.pdf; see Turriff, supra 
note 58, at 291. 
132. Along those lines, Richard Devlin and Albert Cheng have proposed an elaborate 
(although they call it "rather simplistic") assessment methodology for the comparison of 
"diverse regulatory regimes." Devlin & Cheng, supra note 72, at 257-62. 
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The International Bar Association has published an International Rule 
of Law Directory,133 which runs to thirty-four pages, listing hundreds of 
associations, institutes, alliances, societies, movements, programs, centers, 
networks, projects, councils, commissions, campaigns, services, commit-
tees, foundations, and trusts, all with rule of law aspirations. But how many 
of them confine themselves to the promotion and maintenance of lawyer 
independence by modes of regulation that exclude government participa-
tion? I think the answer is none. If that is the case, then you can see why 
those of us who believe in the necessity and vitality of lawyer independ-
ence, as one crucial guarantor of the preservation of the rule of law, are 
concerned that independence might be lost by default. That is why we be-
lieve we have to be earnest in our expression of its importance. 
133. International Rule of Law Directory, INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, 
http://www.roldirectory.org/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2012). 

